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3The coronavirus is an unprecedented external shock that 
is challenging the EU and its member states. The crisis is 
fundamental, posing a dramatic threat to public health and 
the life of citizens. Everyone is affected by the imposition 
of restrictive measures aiming to contain the spread of 
the virus. Efforts to flatten the curve have severely hit our 
economies and will require unparalleled monetary and 
fiscal measures by central banks and governments. 
The future ‘new normal’ will not be a 
simple continuation of a weakened version 
of the status quo ante.
We are still at the beginning of the crisis, and the 
dramatic impact will extend beyond the short term: the 
future ‘new normal’ will not be a simple continuation of a 
weakened version of the status quo ante.
However, no one can truly predict the progression 
and ultimate outcome of the COVID-19 crisis. The 
exceptional nature of the crisis and the magnitude of the 
combined (potential) consequences of the health-related, 
economic, financial, societal, political and geopolitical 
effects make the current situation different from what 
Europeans experienced during the 2010-2015 ‘euro crisis’. 
Nonetheless, some key lessons can be learned and applied 
from that crisis, not least since there is a similar systemic 
and persistent effect on Europe’s economies.
First, the EU and its members stand and fall together. 
No country can isolate itself from the effects of the 
COVID-19 crisis and unconditional solidarity guided 
by the principle of enlightened self-interest will have 
to light the Union’s way out of the crisis. Second, it 
is economically and politically wise to act early and 
forcefully if the EU27 want to get ahead of the curve 
and pre-empt the crisis from spiralling out of control. 
The Union should thus (i) jointly set up and finance a 
common COVID-19 recovery and growth fund; and (ii) 
agree on and then implement a coordinated European 
‘exit management strategy’. Third, EU leaders in all 
member states must recognise that taking absolutist 
positions will undermine the search for an effective 
European strategy to manage and eventually overcome 
the COVID-19 crisis – disunity, fragmentation and 
distrust will result in failure.
We stand and fall together
One major lesson from the euro crisis is linked to the high 
level of interdependence between EU countries and their 
societies. It clearly demonstrated that developments in 
individual member states, even in small economies, can 
have immense repercussions throughout the Union and 
especially among countries sharing the same currency. 
In addition, it showed that crises of such magnitude 
involve negative spillover effects, which ultimately lead 
to political consequences for the EU as a whole, with 
populist eurosceptic and nationalistic forces gaining a 
permanent foothold across the Union. 
Unconditional solidarity guided by the 
principle of enlightened self-interest 
should be the first instinct underpinning 
Europe’s response to the crisis.
No country can isolate itself from the severe effects 
of fundamental crises even if some countries believe 
that they are better prepared to weather the storm 
than others. On the contrary, attempts to deal with the 
COVID-19 crisis individually will backfire as they will 
increase the risk of the situation spiralling out of control, 
with dramatic consequences for everyone. It might sound 
simplistic, but it is true: the pandemic has proven that we 
are all in the same boat. Early recognition of our shared 
responsibility and destiny, which leads to joint and rapid 
European policy actions, will not only be more effective, 
it will also help prevent populations from turning against 
European integration (even further). Belated and timid 
European policy reactions will lead to an increased 
alienation between the Union and its citizens, which will 
be difficult to counter at a later stage and, at the end of 
the day, undermine the ability of policymakers to reach 
substantial compromises at the EU level.
Unconditional solidarity guided by the principle of 
enlightened self-interest should be the first instinct 
underpinning Europe’s response to the crisis. Those hit 
strongest by the virus need the unquestioning support 
of others. While countries have very different means and 
capabilities, this is clearly not the time for judging the 
‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ of other countries’ behaviour and 
trajectory. No country was prepared for this crisis, even if 
some were hit more than others.
In the end, unconditional solidarity is about helping 
fellow European citizens – which is in the interest of 
everyone, regardless of the asymmetric consequences of 
the symmetric external shock that has hit Europe and the 
world. This also means that the EU and its members must 
already be preparing and equipping themselves to help 
other countries around the globe that have been or will 
4be hit by the virus. Solidarity should not be limited to the 
Old Continent. 
The EU and its members will be judged 
on their collective ability to manage 
and, ultimately, master the fundamental 
challenges we are facing.
At the end of the day, the EU and its members will 
be judged on their collective ability to manage and, 
ultimately, master the fundamental challenges we are 
facing. The EU27 struggled in the early moments of the 
COVID-19 crisis when every country was overwhelmed 
and people turned to their national (or even regional) 
governments to deal with the immediate effects of an 
unprecedented health crisis. While there is a legitimate 
reflection on the different competencies, responsibilities 
and means of the EU or member states, and it is clearly 
challenging, both technically and politically, to coordinate 
policy responses collectively under the immediate 
pressures of the pandemic, the EU will either deliver 
together or fail together. Citizens, markets, politicians, 
journalists, and international partners and rivals will 
make a judgement on whether the EU and its institutions 
played a positive role or was proven to be irrelevant – or, 
even worse, a hindrance. If the EU is found wanting, this 
will undermine its raison d’être and legitimacy; nobody 
will ask whether this was caused by the EU institutions or 
the member states, individually or collectively.
Act early and forcefully to get ahead of the curve
Another crucial lesson from the euro crisis is that it is 
economically and politically wise to act early and forcefully 
if one wants to prevent a deterioration of the crisis. The 
experience of 2010-2015 shows that responses were often 
slow, insufficient and occasionally even ill-advised. For a 
long time, especially in the early phase of the crisis, many 
policymakers and even experts were in a state of denial. 
They underestimated the threat and thought incorrectly 
that the situation was under control when in reality 
the crisis was spreading throughout the continent. The 
message that the EU and its main institutions (especially 
the ECB) would do whatever it takes came very late. 
Precious time was lost and significant economic, political 
and societal damage had already been done. This time, we 
should avoid making similar mistakes. 
It is not too late for the EU and its member states to act 
together more decisively. Some important decisions have 
been taken. The European Central Bank (ECB) initiated a 
new temporary Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme 
(PEPP) with an envelope of €750 billion lasting until the 
end of 2020. This is a strong and swift signal that the ECB 
is ready to do everything necessary within its mandate to 
help the euro area through this crisis.  
It is not too late for the EU and its member 
states to act together more decisively.
That the EU was able to agree on key elements of a 
comprehensive fiscal and economic package in reaction 
to the COVID-19 crisis was another important step. It 
includes (i) the creation of a temporary instrument to 
support national unemployment safety nets (i.e. SURE), 
as proposed by the European Commission channelling up 
to €100 billion to the member states facing the greatest 
pressures; (ii) the scaling up of the European Investment 
Bank’s (EIB) initiatives enabling it to guarantee loans of 
up to €200 billion, with a focus on small and medium-
sized enterprises; and (iii) the establishment of Pandemic 
Crisis Support through the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), providing a precautionary credit line for the 
amount of 2% of member states’ GDP (i.e. close to €240 
billion) to support the domestic financing of direct and 
indirect healthcare-, cure- and prevention-related costs.  
The EU and its members must act  
forcefully now, anticipating and mitigating 
worst-case scenarios.
All these measures are necessary and point in the right 
direction. But they are not enough – more is needed for 
the EU to get ahead of the curve and the window to do 
so will be closing soon. This is especially important as 
the COVID-19 crisis comes with increased uncertainty 
and significant downside risks. The EU and its members 
must act forcefully now, anticipating and mitigating 
worst-case scenarios. As witnessed during the euro 
crisis, the EU and its members should recognise that the 
situation will deteriorate further and requires decisive 
common interventions which should come early, rather 
than attempt to firefight each step of the way. Hesitating 
in the early phases of the COVID-19 crisis will worsen 
not only the current situation but also the longer-term 
consequences of the pandemic.
5Thus, the EU27 should already at this point agree on  
two additional central pillars of its comprehensive  
crisis response:
q As a strong sign of collective solidarity, the Union 
should jointly set up and finance a time-limited 
and targeted common COVID-19 recovery and 
growth fund. It should assist especially the member 
states and regions that have been hit hardest by the 
crisis and lack the means to safeguard and restart 
their economies effectively. The establishment of a 
common stimulus programme is an indispensable 
core element of the EU’s overall fiscal and economic 
package. It is linked to and will also codetermine the 
success of other measures and instruments initiated 
at both the national and European levels (i.e. PEPP, 
SURE, EIB lending, ESM credit lines). A recovery and 
growth fund is necessary for the EU to recover from 
the severe economic shock by creating additional 
demand once the immediate crisis is (more or less) 
under control.
The fund should mobilise future-oriented investment 
and help spread the extraordinary costs of the 
COVID-19 crisis over time and across different 
shoulders. Reflecting some of the proposals discussed 
within the framework of the Eurogroup in preparation 
of the European Council videoconference on 23 
April, financing should rest on a combination of two 
elements: the emission of a time-limited, one-off 
issuance of common debt and the use of leveraged 
financing tools linked to an exceptional time-limited 
increase of the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF). A combination of these two elements would 
increase the chances of reaching a compromise at the 
highest political level.
q To avoid a patchwork of disconnected national 
exit strategies, the EU27 should agree on and 
then implement a coordinated; comprehensive; 
gradual; and nationally, regionally or even locally 
adaptable European ‘exit management strategy’. 
The existence of such a strategy will enhance 
predictability beyond national borders and help the 
EU27 and its highly connected member states move 
to some sort of ‘new normality’ collectively and 
gradually, even if this process will take some time 
and will be characterised by many ups and downs in 
different phases of the recovery process.
The strategy must not follow a one-size-fits-all 
approach over time and space. On the contrary, 
its implementation should be dynamic and reflect 
the situation on the ground at the national or 
subnational levels. Coordination will be essential to 
also deal with the differential economic impacts that 
different exit timings will impose on the member 
states. The Joint European Roadmap towards lifting 
COVID-19 containment measures, presented on 15 
April, provides a promising basis for and good start 
to the process of a joint ‘exit management strategy’. 
However, the details of the strategy need to be spelled 
out further, and the gradual implementation of the 
roadmap will have to be closely coordinated with and 
among the EU27.
Avoid and overcome absolutist positions
Leaders at both the national and EU levels should 
recognise that taking absolutist positions will neither 
contribute to finding a solution nor be politically 
sustainable, as they will most likely have to go further 
than originally intended given the magnitude of the 
crisis and thereby overstep some of their own red 
lines. They should recognise that decisive common 
action is indispensable and then work to elaborate, 
agree and communicate a compromise package. An 
effective European strategy to manage and eventually 
overcome the COVID-19 crisis requires a high level 
of unity – fragmentation and distrust will ultimately 
end in failure. Substantial breakthroughs will require 
consensus at the highest political level among the  
EU27 or Euro-19; and this will only be possible if all 
countries can demonstrate that they benefit from 
compromises while national concerns have been  
taken seriously.
Rather than using stigmatising terminology and 
returning to futile reactions of the past, what is 
important now is actual substance and delivery, 
whatever the instruments called in the end might be. To 
get there, the EU27 need to have the political courage 
to jump over individual political and national shadows 
and overcome some of the past differences that still 
undermine the adoption of necessary crisis responses. 
Rather than using stigmatising 
terminology and returning to futile 
reactions of the past, what is important 
now is actual substance and delivery, 
whatever the instruments called in the  
end might be.
EU institutions have a critical role to play in the 
process of reaching package deals. The Presidents of 
the European Commission and European Council must 
come up with proposals at the highest political level 
and work in tandem as honest brokers, aiming to bridge 
6the diverging positions. They have to ensure that they 
enjoy the trust of all national governments and carry out 
shuttle diplomacy – or, in this case ‘tele-diplomacy’ – to 
bring (key) member states on board. Leaving this task to 
individual national capitals will not work. 
The experience of the euro crisis has 
shown that no country can play to the 
domestic gallery without significant 
repercussions for the rest of Europe.
EU institutions and their leaders will only be successful 
if this process is supported at the member state level 
actively. The experience of the euro crisis has shown 
that no country can play to the domestic gallery without 
significant repercussions for the rest of Europe. National 
policymakers should be aware that all of Europe is 
listening even when they assume that they are ‘only’ 
addressing their national audience. The EU might not 
yet have developed a supranational public space but, 
especially in times of crisis, there is an inter-national 
public that follows domestic debates closely in all 
member states.
Inflammatory and discriminating language, nationalistic 
chauvinism, historical resentments, judgements of 
morality as well as expressions of national superiority will 
undermine necessary compromises, which in turn creates 
political costs for everybody. National governments and 
policymakers need to constantly explain the European 
dimension of today’s crisis to their populations and why 
acting together across borders is important now more 
than ever. They should explain why an effective response 
to the crisis relies on EU cooperation and solidarity 
guided by the notion of self-interest, which is not only 
the right approach but will also be far more effective than 
individual, national initiatives and policy measures. EU 
leaders will have to present a joint vision that not only 
deals with the immediate health threat but also provides 
a sustainable economic recovery based on joint purpose 
and action.
Time to compromise
So far, the collective performance of the EU and its 
member states has been insufficient. The impression 
Europe gave in the initial moments of the COVID-19 
crisis was one of fragmentation and disunity. On 
many occasions, we witnessed a lack of coordination 
and cooperation as national governments and EU 
institutions often remained wedded to pre-crisis 
differences and positions, rather than recognising the 
unprecedented nature of the current situation and the 
need to go beyond old recipes. 
In countries hit hardest by the pandemic, 
there is a widespread sentiment that fellow 
member states have not been willing to 
support them.
In countries hit hardest by the pandemic, there is a 
widespread sentiment that fellow member states have 
not been willing to support them. This impression has 
already played into the hands of populist eurosceptic 
and nationalist forces, and much will have to be done to 
prevent this sentiment from having long-lasting effects 
at both the European and national levels. On the other 
hand, there have been many instances of demonstrated 
solidarity across borders, such as the treatment of 
critically ill patients in other EU countries. Such 
individual gestures of solidarity are significant, necessary 
and welcome, but remain insufficient if other decisive 
steps to counter the COVID-19 crisis are not taken. 
Rather than concentrating on one 
particular instrument, the EU institutions 
should assemble a convincing package  
deal that is explicitly supported by  
member states.
As during the euro crisis, the EU and its members will 
likely take more decisive collective action, driven by 
necessity rather than choice. But time is of the essence – 
waiting too long will not only cause significant collateral 
damage to the level of cooperation between the EU27 
but also undermine the public support for European 
integration. This will reduce the effectiveness of policy 
interventions, making it harder to avert, cushion or 
reverse the negative economic, financial, societal and 
political impacts of the COVID-19 crisis across the EU.
It is not too late. The EU is capable of collaborating, 
and there are many possible policy interventions on 
the table. Rather than concentrating on one particular 
instrument, the EU institutions should assemble a 
7convincing package deal that is explicitly supported by 
member states.
In the euro crisis, the EU and its members did not move 
fast nor decisively enough – at least until there was no 
alternative. The Union failed to demonstrate sufficiently 
that unconditional solidarity remains a core element 
of EU action. Now, in the COVID-19 crisis, the EU27 
must get it right. If the Union and its members do not 
deliver, the EU might be condemned to irrelevance in the 
eyes of many, creating a long-term existential threat to 
European integration. In the end, this would be justified 
as long as the Union is unable to support all Europeans 
through this unprecedented fundamental crisis.
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